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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Authority for this appeal is found within the confine of Section 
77-35-26 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure; Utah State 
Constitution Article I, Section 77-1-6(g); and Section 78-2a-3 Utah Code 
Annotated, and the rules of the Utah Court of Appeals. 
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Text of Statutes 
U.C.A. 41-6-43 
(1) An ordinance adopted by a local authority that governs a 
persons operating or being in actual physical control of a motor vehicle 
while having alcohol in the blood or while under the influence of alcohol 
or any drug or the combined influence of alcohol and any drug, or that 
governs, in relation to any of those matter, the use of a chemical test or 
chemical tests, or evidentiary presumptions, or penalties, or that 
governs any combination of those matters, shall be consistent with the 
provisions in this code which govern those matters. 
U.C.A. 1953, Amend 1987, 41-6-44 
(1) (a) It is unlawful and punishable as provided in this section 
for any person to operate or be in actual physical control of a vehicle 
within this state if the person has a blood or breath alcohol content of 
.08% or greater by weight as shown by a chemical test given within two 
hours after the alleged operation or physical control, or if the person is 
under the influence of alcohol or any drug or the combined influence of 
alcohol and any drug to a degree which renders the person incapable of 
safely operating a vehicle. 
10-17-1 Revised Ordinances of Richfield, 1976 compilation. 
iv 
Code Adopted. That certain code in book form known as "Utah 
Traffic Code, Rules of the Road, 1974" compiled by the Department of 
Public Safety and as amended and superseded from time to time is 
hereby adopted as to all provisions contained in that code in book form 
which are not expressly covered by the foregoing chapters and all such 
laws, rules and regulations not covered by the foregoing chapters but 
contained in said code shall be in full force and effect within Richfield 
City. Not less than three (3) copies of said book shall remain on file in 
the Office of the City Recorder. (10-6-12; Title 41, UCA 1953, as it 
effects powers of local authorities to adopt traffic regulations, passim.) 
(Date of adoption 1983). 
v 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
ISSUE I: Whether evidence presented to the Court is sufficient 
for finding that the defendant was in actual physical control of a motor 
vehicle sufficient to find him guilty of the offense charged. The 
defendant was located within his vehicle with the headlights on. The 
engine was not running. The keys were in the ignition. The defendant 
was covered with a blanket and asleep laying on the front seat not in a 
position to drive. He was using the vehicle for sleeping purposes. 
ISSUE II: Whether the City of Richfield had statutory authority 
to prosecute the defendant under Richfield City Ordinance; to-wit, 
whether the City of Richfield hd properly adopted an ordinance to 
prosecute the offense of driving under the influence of alcohol. 
VI 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
RICHFIELD CITY : 
Plaintiff, Respondent , 
V . 
JAMES M. WALKER 
Defendant, Appellant 
Case # 890156-CA 
Appellant's Pnef 
STATEMENT QF THE CAgg 
Appeal from a judgment and conviction of "Actual physical 
control of a vehicle with a blood alcohol content of .08% or greater." , a 
class B misdemeanor, in violation of 41-6-44 (Utah Code Ann. 1953 as 
amended), in the sixth circuit court, in and for Severe County, State of 
Utah, the Honorable David L. Mower , presiding. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent is an incorporated city. The city is empowered to 
enact ordinances, the enforcement of which is handled by the city 
prosecutor. The appellant was charged and convicted by the 
respondent with the offense of driving under the influence of 
Intoxicants U.C.A. 41-6-44 (R. Memorandum decision 87-TF-1140) 
1 
Officer Duane Sickels, of the Richfield City Police was on routine 
patrol at approximately 0130 hours on June 30, 1987 when he noticed a 
blue ford vehicle parked at the Quality Inn with its lights on. Upon 
approaching the vehicle he found the defendant asleep on the seat. (R. 
3). The defendant was sleeping on the seat with his feet towards the 
driver's side and was covered with a blanket. The engine was not 
running but the keys had been in the left in the ignition and the lights 
left on. (R. 3). 
Mr. Walker, the appellant, testified he had attempted to get a 
room at the Quality Inn but they were full so he returned to his vehicle 
to sleep. (R. 8). At the time Officer Sickels found Mr. Walker in his 
truck he was sleeping. (R. 5). 
Officer Sickels had Mr. Walker perform several sobriety tests 
which he failed. (R. 4). Mr. Walker was then arrested for "Driving 
under the influence1' and taken to the police station. At the station he 
was given a breath alyzer test which registered at .21%. (R. 8). 
Mr. Walker was tried on this charge and found guilty by two 
decisions, the first on Feb. 7, 1989, and June 29, 1988. (R. 
Memorandum decision 87-TF-1140). The effect of the Court's decision 
was to find him guitly for a violation of the 1983 laws, after they were 
significantly amended each year thereafter. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
9 
ISSUE I: It is a well settled principal of Utah case law that in order 
for the defendant to be found in "actual physical control" of a motor 
vehicle the defendant must be behind the wheel. The defendant was 
not behind the wheel. He was a passive occupant of the vehicle since he 
was using it as a place to sleep. It would be a against the policy of the 
legislature to find the defendant guilty because such a holding would 
promote rather than discourage driving under the influence. 
Issue II: Whether the City of Richfield had statutory authority to 
prosecute the defendant under a Richfield City Ordinance; to-wit, 
whether the city of Richfield had properly adopted an ordinance to 
prosecute the offense of driving under the influence of alcohol. 
The information accuses the defendant of a violation of the city 
ordinance prohibiting the person form driving a motor vehicle under 
the influence of alcohol or having a blood-alcohol content of .08% or 
greater. This ordinance seeks to adopt the provisions of 41-6-44, Utah 
Code Annotated 1983. It fails to adopt the 1987, 1986, 1985, nor the 
1984 revisions. 
The defendant was charged with a violation of this ordinance. At 
the time of said event, the ordinance prescribed a penalty for violation 
of this offense as set forth in the 1983 version of 41-6-44, Utah Code 
Annotated. 
^ 
Pursuant to the laws of 1987, with the effective date being April 
28, 1987, the state legislature enacted laws setting forth the elements 
for a violation of this state statute, particularly 41-6-44 as follows: 
d 
(1) (a) It is unlawful and punishable as provided in 
this section for any person to operate or be in actual 
physical control of a vehicle within this state if the 
person has a blood or breath alcohol content of .08% or 
greater by weight as shown by a chemical test given 
within two hours after the alleged operation or physical 
control, or if the person is under the influence of alcohol 
or any drug or the combined influence of alcohol and any 
drug to a degree which renders the person incapable of 
safely operating a vehicle. 
This city has failed to adopt this ordinance. The city has also 
failed to adopt the amendment of 1984, 1985, 1986, and 1987. 
Defendant submits the state's statutes, particularly 41-6-43, Utah 
Code Annotated, prohibits the city form enacting any ordinance 
inconsistent with the provisions of 41-4-43, 41-6-44, and the other 
appropriate and relevant statutes thereto. Since the state has 
preempted the area, the city's ordinance, inconsistent therewith, is 




Whether evidence presented to the Court is sufficient for finding 
that the defendant was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle 
sufficient to find him guilty of the offense charged. The defendant was 
located within his vehicle with the headlights on. The engine was not 
running. The keys were in the ignition. The defendant was covered 
with a blanket and asleep, laying on the front seat not in a position to 
drive. He was using the vehicle for sleeping purposes, and based on his 
actions prior to going to sleep, proved at trial, showed an intent to sleep 
off the alcohol rather than endanger the public by driving in an 
intoxicated condition. 
The two cases cited most frequently in the State of Utah relating 
to driving or actual physical control issues are State v. Bugger. 25 Ut. 2d 
404, 483 P2d 442 (1971); and Lopez v. Schwendiman. 720 P2d 778 
(Utah 1986). The principal holding in Bugger is: 
The term "actual physical control" in its ordinary 
sense means "existing" or "present bodily restraint, 
directing influence, domination or regulation." It is clear 
that in the record before us the facts did not bring the 
case within the wording of the statute. The defendant at 
the time of his arrest was not control of the vehicle nor 
was he exercising any dominion over it. 
* 
The facts of Bugger reveal a remarkable similarity. The 
defendant was asleep in his vehicle, which was parked on the shoulder 
of the road. The automobile was completely off the traveled portion of 
the highway, and the motor was not running. Being in a parking lot 
seems sufficient enough to be considered off of the traveled portion of 
the road and leaving the lights on hardly seems enough of a difference 
to deviate from the stare decisis of a previous Supreme Court decision. 
The prosecution would seek to rely on the more recent case of 
Lopez to sustain a finding of actual physical control. This case however 
is distinguishable from the present case and distinguishes itself from 
Bugger. 
Lopez compares his situation to the facts of Bugger . 
. . where the driver if the vehicle had parked his car 
completely off the road, had turned off the motor, and 
was sleeping. Nothing in that case indicates that the 
driver in the driver's seat at the time he was found and 
arrested. "Positioning in the driver's seat is an element 
common to all of the cases that have found actual 
physical control of a motionless vehicle." [cases cited] 
Lopez v. Schwendiman. 720 P2d 778 , @780 (Utah 1986). 
The policy of the legislature which is to be implemented by the 
court is best summed up in Garcia v. Schwendiman. 645 P2d 651, @ 654 
(1982): 
7 
As a matter of public policy and statutory 
construction, we believe that the 'actual physical control1 
language of Utah's implied consent statute should be read 
as intending to prevent intoxicated drivers form entering 
their vehicles except as passengers or passive occupants 
as in Bugger supra. Therefore, under the facts before us, 
where a motorist occupied the driver's position behind 
the steering wheel, with possession of the ignition key 
[sic] and with the apparent ability to start and move the 
vehicle, we hold that there has been an adequate showing 
of 'actual physical control'. . . " 
This policy "that it is better to deter or prevent an intoxicated 
person from operating a motor vehicle than it is to punish such person 
after he has injured himself or others." see Lopez. 674 P2d 690. 
Would be defeated by affirming the conviction. It cannot be proved if 
the defendant was over the legal limit to drive when he began driving, 
nor is it dispositive to this case. He recognized the fact that he was 
approaching or possibly exceeding the limit. He then made a decision 
rather than to continue driving in an impaired manner to attempt to 
find lodging. When the motel was full the defendant returned to his 
vehicle, procured a blanket, and fell asleep on the front seat. He 
showed an intent, by his actions, not to drive until the affects of the 
alcohol in his blood wore off. 
x 
By affirming the conviction of James Walker the court would not 
only be going against the precedent of Bugger. It would be encouraging 
a person who is driving home after drinking to continue driving even 
after they realize they may be over the legal limit. Rather than to pull 
over and sleep it off they would be better off to try to make it home. 
After all if they are able to make it home without being pulled over 
they are at least safe from being awakened and arrested. 
Issue I I : 
At trial the city argued the it had the power to prosecute a DUI 
charge based on an ordinance incorporating the Utah Traffic Code as 
amended and superseded from time to time by reference to said code. 
Richfield Ord. 10-17-1. The trial court correctly ruled this was an 
improper delegation of legislative power of the city. (R. Memorandum 
decision 87-TF-1140). However, the court did not properly rule on the 
effect of this failure. 
The enabling statute for the DUI Legislation, Section 41-6-43, Utah 
Code Annotated, provides as follows: 
(1) An ordinance adopted by a local authority that 
governs a person's operating or being in actual physical 
control of a motor vehicle while having alcohol in the 
blood or while under the influence of alcohol or any drug 
or the combined influence of alcohol and any drug, or 
o 
that governs, in relation to any of those matter, the use of 
a chemical test or chemical tests, or evidentiary 
presumptions, or penalties, or that governs any 
combination of those matters, shall be consistent with 
the provisions in this code which govern those matters, 
(emphasis added) 
Pursuant thereto, the enabling statute mandates that all local 
ordinances shall be consistent with the provisions of the Utah State Code 
which govern those matters, including penalties. 
Said provisions in violation or being inconsistent with the State's 
statutes of 1987, are repealed pursuant thereto; the mandate of the 
state legislature requires that all local authorities shall adopt "DUI 
Laws" in conformance with the provision therein. 
A local or a municipal ordinance is invalid if it intrudes into an 
area where the legislature has preemptied it by comprehensive 
legislation intended to blanket a particular field of concern. State v. 
Hutchinson. 624 P.2d 1116 (Utah 1980). 
Further, a local government is without authority to pass any 
ordinance prohibited by, or in conflict with State statutory laws. Salt 
Lake Citv v. Alfred. 20 Utah 2d 298, 437 P2d 434 (1968). 
Defendant contends and submits that the present City ordinance, 
upon which this prosecution lies, is in conflict with the mandates of the 
state legislature as set forth by the present provisions of Section 41-4-
i n 
43 and the sections corresponding thereto. The failure of the 
prosecution to enact laws in accordance with said dictates of 41-6-43 is 
to repeal the local authority of the city to prosecute said inconsistent 
law. Algood v. Larsen. 545 P2d 530 (Utah 1976); Salt Lake Citv v. 
Davidson. 27 Utah 2d 71, 493 P2d 301 (1972); Lark v. Whitehead. 28 
Utah 2d 343, 502 P2d 557 (1972). 
State statute requires said laws be consistent with the provisions 
dictated by Section 41-6-43. The particular language, "shall be", is 
mandatory to the city authority. It governs evidentiary issues, chemical 
tests, and penalties. 
Presently, the city is prosecuting an ordinance which has failed to 
adopt the provisions of 41-4-44. The city ordinance does not set forth 
the definition of the criminal offense as required by State statute. A 
significant substantial change has been made. 
In another case with similar facts, the court first found the 
attempt to adopt further amendments was an unconstitutional 
delegation of lawmaking power. A city council may not by ordinance 
make future amendments of a statute part of a city ordinance. "It 
constitutes an unconstitutional delegation of the legislative power of the 
city." State v. LookabilL 176 Neb. 254 N.W. 2d 695, @697 (1964). In 
Lookabill the defendant was convicted of operating a motor vehicle 
while under the influence of alcohol. Defendant asserted the following 
as grounds for quashing the Complaint1 (1) there was no ordinance 
making the charge an offense; and (2) the ordinance purporting to 
1 i 
invest the police with jurisdiction to enforce any penalty is illegal, void, 
and unconstitutional. IcL @696. The court held" "The provision 'as may 
be amended1 is void and of no force and effect as an attempt to make 
future amendments of the statute amendments 'ipso facto' of the city 
ordinance. 
In Brinklev. the Court stated: "We conclude that if petitioner was 
arrested for violation of the Hines City ordinance, there is no valid 
arrest because there was no valid ordinance." Brinklev v. Motor Vehicle 
Division. 47 Or App 25, 613 P2d 1071 (1980). 
Consequently, the defendant submits that the ordinance of which 
is the foundation of this charge, is in violation and in conflict with state 
statute. The city has failed to conform with the mandates of the State 
and therefore, the ordinance which served as the basis for the 
conviction is invalid. 
CONCLUSION 
The defendant was not in actual physical control" of the vehicle at 
the time of his arrest. Without actual control as defined by the supreme 
court and the plain meaning of some type of voluntary intent to control 
the conviction must be reversed. 
1 ? 
If the court finds sufficient grounds to sustain actual physical 
control the ordinance which the city based its conviction on was invalid. 
The city must adopt ordinances which are in harmony with the states 
definition. U.C.A. 41-6-43. By not doing this the city acted without 
authority to convict the defendant. 
1 1 
Respectfully submitted thisQLi day of July, 1989. 
Sheldon R Carter (0589) 
Attorney for fhe Appellant 
Certificate of Service 
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Sheldon R Carter (0589) 
Attorney for/the Appellant 
Delivered by this day of July, '1989. 
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